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Based upon the outcome of the Geneva Negotiations now going on, and hope-
fully to be concluded in 1977, the responsibilities of the Department will ob-
viously expand. I think the most significant point of all in what I have outlined
is the fact that at every level within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
in the three military departments, right down through line commands, the
principal responsibility for seeing to it that the laws of war are complied with
lies with the legal officials. In many areas, such as training and development
of materials, their role is as advisers. But the primary responsibility lies with
them. If the lawyers execute their responsibilities and take the initiative to call
the shots, even when it may not be a technical intervention point under the
regulations and directives, American forces will comply with the Rules of Law.
If the lawyers wait to be consulted by the policy makers, some points may be
overlooked. I think it is very significant that the lawyers have been given, and
will continue to have, this kind of fundamental responsibility.
MAJOR GENERAL VAGUE: The next speaker is the Chief Judge of the Court
of Military Appeals. He can hardly fail to touch upon the type of cases that
could reach him in the disciplinary aspects of insuring compliance with the
Laws of War. The Honorable Albert Fletcher is an ex-Army Air Corpsman as
well as a distinguished attorney, author, university lecturer, and a Judge of the
Eighth Judicial District in Kansas for a period of 16 years.
Individual Responsibility for Compliance
with the Laws of Armed Conflict
JUDGE ALBERT B. FLETCHER
The laws of armed conflict provide standards for the individual, as differen-
tiated from the state. Criminal sanctions attach for violations of these stan-
dards. But these so-called individual crimes are not codified in any single
instrument. In fact, an individual may be held responsible for certain actions
even though the prohibited conduct has not been reduced to writing but has
developed under rules of customary international law. Second, we must keep
in mind that there is no absolute defense for these "crimes." All defenses are
relative to time and place not only of the alleged criminal act but the forum for
trial. Third, criminal acts under the laws of armed conflict do not necessarily
lead to an adjudication of criminal responsibility, i.e., a trial with findings of
fact and conclusions of law. In this order I would like to look at these three
considerations.
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Looking first to the criminal act, I must reiterate that these prohibitions are
not neatly codified with distinct elements set forth for each specified prohibi-
tion; all possible acts of criminality are not even in writing. Their existence
derives from the customary international laws of war which come into being
when states have followed a clear and continuous habit of acting in a certain
manner and have accepted either expressly or impliedly that such action is
obligatory or right. I
We should not condemn too greatly the vagueness of the obligations imposed
upon individuals. General wording is necessary for ratification by as many
nations as possible, and, maybe even more fundamentally, it provides a code
of aspiration, of minimum standards of civilization. As a result, states are given
wide discretion as to the enforcement of alleged violations. It is necessary for
my understanding and comprehension of the prohibitions that they be divided
into individual responsibility at two different levels of military command.
The first level, which I shall refer to as the policy level, relates to those in
command with general policy decision powers. The second level is those in the
field who implement that policy which I shall refer to as the implementation
level. The dividing line between these two levels cannot be specifically desig-
nated for all times at the same place on the vertical scale of military command.
Individuals working at the policy level could be charged with violation of
prohibitions provided for under the laws of armed conflict in the following par-
ticulars: the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements, or the general rules of war or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the same. Further,
and more specifically, for murder, ill-treatment, enslavement, or deportation
of civilians or the civilian population, for murder or ill-treatment of prisoners
of war, killing hostages, plundering of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, the commission of inhuman acts committed against the
civilian populace before or during the conflict, or prosecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds.
Individuals on the implementation level, could be held criminally responsible
in these specific areas in the general prohibitions: Deliberate attack on pro-
tected medical establishments, the misuse of a non-military unit attached
generally to a military unit such as the Red Cross, a dishonest or fraudulent
request for truce, the abuse of a tendered flag of truce, the willful or wanton
destruction of persons or property for the sake of destruction only; the inten-
tional use of civilian clothing to conceal military persons during conflict, the
willful and intentional use of privileged buildings, i.e., museums, etc., or desig-
'ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1971).
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nated land areas for military use, intentional killing without trial, intentional
or purposeful plundering of public or private property, and finally, deliberately
depriving any protected person of his fair trial rights.
I have spoken in generalities, for I cannot find anywhere the sufficiently
precise language to satisfy the legal or judicial mind as to certainty. A broad
principle might be that war does not exclude moral conduct and that immoral
conduct which violates minimum standards of civilization or humanity requires
accountability. But morality is relative to time and to an individual society.
There is a clear need for states to develop specific codes for violations of the law
of armed conflict and then to use these codes as the basis for criminal respon-
sibility.
I can say with certainty that, to be criminal, the acts must be intentional. In
other words, the actor must have mens rea. He must have a guilty mind or his
acts must be so grossly or wantonly negligent that they are equated with inten-
tional acts.
I believe that certainty as to areas of criminality based upon the prohibitions
of the laws of armed conflict is more apparent when we look at the possible
defenses.
The umbrella defense to most of the prohibitions to which I have alluded is
"military necessity." I find the term difficult to define for it is static only in its
verbiage, and at all other times would seem to be ad hoc. So I will, for this
purpose, accept a definition handed down by a United States military tribunal.
It states in part:
[M]ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, i.e., the laws of
armed conflict, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submis-
sion of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In gen-
eral, it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces
and to facilitate the success of his operation. It permits the destruction of armed enemies
and other persons whose elimination is incidentally required by the armed conflicts of
the war. It allows the capture of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it
does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satis-
faction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of inter-
national law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of
property and the overcoming of an enemy force. It is lawful to destroy railway lines or
communications, or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private
homes and churches may be destroyed if necessary for military operations, but that does
not permit the wanton devastation of a district or a willful infliction of suffering upon its
inhabitants for the sake of suffering alone.'
I approach with a jaundiced eye a definition which in its defining uses the
'United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS 1253-4 (1950).
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words you need defined, such as "necessities of war" and "if necessary for
military operations." Military necessity is a value judgment at the policy level.
Military necessity will be judged generally after the cessation of the conflict.
Not only the specific accomplishment, but as it figures into the total jigsaw
puzzle of that conflict. I suggest to you, contrary to the normal rules of English
jurisprudence, hindsight is given considerable weight.
Military necessity takes on another parameter at the implementation level,
and that is the element of time. At this level, one is only a single facet of the
wh6le. Scheduled objectives for accomplishment depend upon several persons
or units acting in conjunction, not singularly. The period of time to make a
judgment is minimized. Once again I would suggest that only in retrospect will
it be ascertainable if military necessity rises to the level of a defense. However,
that judgment must be based on factors existing prior to and at the time of the
particular military operation involved and not on the results.
A military society, as mentioned before, is vertical. This is necessary to ac-
complish the avowed purpose of that society-the protection of the parent
society. The military society must rely upon command and command functions
by order. This presents us with the second defense. I will call it the "order
defense." It exists at the policy level and implementation level, although the
two differ to some degree.
I will use as a starting point for discussion of the order defense a statement
shown in the Army Field Manual. "A military commander is not only respon-
sible for criminal acts that he orders, but also liable for actions within his
command of which he has actual knowledge or should have known." 3 It can be
seen from this statement that we are dealing with a two-fold defense: from the
one who orders and the one who receives the order. The only persons who
cannot be caught in both folds are those at the top or the bottom of the com-
mand ladder.
Let us look first at the Yamashita opinion by the Supreme Court of the
United States wherein it was stated,
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose excesses are
unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander would almost certainly result in
violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect
civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would be largely defeated if the
commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable
measures for their protection. Hence, the law of war presupposes that its violation is to
be avoided through the control of the operation of war by commanders who are to some
extent responsible for their subordinates.'
3 UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, 1956.
'Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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Without specifically saying it, the Supreme Court accepted the standard
set forth in the Army Field Manual. Imbedded in that standard is constructive
knowledge, a very severe standard. I ask you to keep this standard in mind as
the one that was used for the trial of a national of one state in a forum of another
state as we look to the next case.
I am referring to the case of United States v. Medina, a case arising out of
the Mai Lai incident. By instruction to the jury, actual knowledge of illegal
conduct was the only criterion. It poses the question: was a different standard
applied where accused and court were of the same country? But the important
point is that there was a trial for alleged misconduct.
Let us take a quick look at the other side of the coin-an order given. I need
only look at a decision my Court handed down prior to my being there: Follow-
ing the Manual for Courts-Martial, the Court stated:
An order requiring the performance of a military duty may be inferred to be legal. An act
performed manifestly beyond the scope of authority or pursuant to an order that a man
of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be illegal or any wanton manner in
the discharge of a lawful duty is not excusable. 5
I believe that it would be improper for me to comment as to whether I agree
or disagree with the Court's statement. Suffice it to say that if a determination
as to the availability of a defense is to be based upon the legality or illegality
of an order, an educational process must be implemented not only for the
military but also for the civilian components of our society. The laws of individ-
ual responsibility in armed conflict traditionally have been assimilated more
through the sociological process of folkways and custom rather than through
formal education. I would suggest further that the temporary military man has
no concept that there are individual responsibilities provided for in the laws of
armed conflict other than what little education he may have received in basic
training. The area of training and education is critical to prevention of viola-
tions and needs to be strongly developed in depth for us to insure adequate
observance of the laws of armed conflict.
Let me conclude by discussing the third area, which is that criminal acts
based upon prohibitions do not necessarily lead to criminal accountability.
There is a general proposition that states will impose upon their own nationals
criminal responsibility where it is necessary to maintain discipline, for discipline
is the backbone of a fighting force. Other than this, an individual breach of a
prohibition will only find its way into a criminal forum where the conscience of
the governmental leaders or civilian population has been stricken; or, where
a nation fears adverse reaction of the other nations whose support it needs. I
SParagraph 216d. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969 (rev.); United States v.
Calley. 22 USCMA 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973).
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